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Abstract
We develop a novel formal theory of finite structures, based on a view of finite
structures as a fundamental artifact of computing and programming, forming a
common platform for computing both within particular finite structures, and
in the aggregate for computing over infinite data-types construed as families of
finite structures. A finite structure is here a finite collection of finite partial-
functions, over a common universe of atoms. The theory is second-order, as it
uses quantification over finite functions.
Our formal theory FS uses a small number of fundamental axiom-schemas,
with finiteness enforced by a schema of induction on finite partial-functions.
We show that computability is definable in the theory by existential formulas,
generalizing Kleene’s Theorem on the Σ1-definability of RE sets, and use that
result to prove that FS is mutually interpretable with Peano Arithmetic.
1 Introduction
We develop a formal theory of finite structures, motivated in part by an imperative
programming language for transforming such structures.
Our point of departure is to posit finite structures as a fundamental artifact of
computing and programming. It is a truism that a database is a finite structure. But
elements of infinite data-types, such as the natural numbers or binary strings, are also
finite-structures that obey certain requirements. Computing over such a data-type
can thus be construed as a transformation process driven by those structures’ internal
making. Viewed from that angle, a function computed by a transducer-program is per-
ceived as a mapping over the space of finite-structures, rather than a function within
a particular infinite structure. Thus, finite partial-structures form a common platform
for computing both within particular finite structures, and in the aggregate for com-
puting over infinite data-types, as long as their elements are not infinite themselves
(e.g. streams).
Our theory is second-order, in that we quantify over structures (via a quantification
over finite functions). The well-known second-order nature of inductive data is thus
manifested in the computation objects being themselves second-order, albeit finite
ones. The atoms, from which our finite structures are built, are the first-order elements.
They are nameless and structure-less, and there must be an unlimited supply of them
1
to permit unhindered structure extension during computation. One intends to identify
structures that differ only by the choice of atoms, i.e. ones that are isomorphic to each
other, though it turns out that we can often convey that intent implicitly, without
complicating matters with permanent references to equivalence classes.
Since referencing objects by constant and function identifiers is central to impera-
tive programming, we choose to base our structures on partial-functions, rather than
sets or relations. That is, each one of our structures is a finite set of finite partial-
functions. The Tarskian notion of an explicit structure universe is superfluous here:
the only atoms that matter are the ones that appear as inputs and/or outputs of a
structure’s functions, a set we shall call the structure’s scope.
Finally, as we base our finite structures on finite partial-functions, the basic oper-
ations on structures must be function-updates of some form. This is analogous to the
operation of adjoining an element to a set, which underlies several existing theories of
finite sets (see below).
In fact, the idea that inductive data-objects, such as the natural numbers, can be
construed as being composed of underlying units, goes back all the way to Euclid,
who defined a number as “a multitude composed of units” [4, 7th book, definition
2]. The logicist project of Frege, Dedekind and Russell, which attempted to reduce
mathematics to logic’s first principles, included this very same reduction of natural
numbers to finite sets. The current predominant view of natural numbers as irreducible
primal objects was advocated by opponents of the logicist project, notably Poincare´
[5] and Kronecker, whose critique was subsequently advanced by the emergence of
Tarskian semantics and by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems.
Philosophical considerations aside, the kinship between natural numbers and finite
sets raises interesting questions about the formalization of finite set theory, and the
mutual interpretation of such a theory with formal theories for arithmetic. Several
formal theories proposed for finite set theory are based on ZF with the Axiom of
Infinity replaced by its negation, which we denote here by ZFf . [10] shows that ZFf
can be interpreted in PA (Theorem 3.1), and that PA can be interpreted in ZFf
(Theorem 4.5), but not by the inverse of the former. That inverse would work for
the interpretation of PA provided ZFf is augmented with a Transitive Containment
axiom, asserting that every set is contained in a transitive set (Theorem 6.5). A result
analogous to the latter1 was proved by Wang already in 1953 [22], where he uses an
axiom (ALG) analogous to Transitive Containment, stating the enumerability of the
collection of all finite sets.
It seems, though, that ZFf is somewhat of an oxymoron, in that it embraces ZF, a
theory designed specifically to reason about infinity, only to eviscerate it off the bat by
excluding infinity.2 An approach more germane to finiteness was proposed already by
Zermelo [24, Theorem 3], Whitehead and Russell [23, *120.23], Sierpin´ski [18, p.106],
Kuratowski [11], and Tarski [20]. It enforces finiteness by an induction principle for
sets: if ∅ satisfies a property ϕ and whenever X satisfies ϕ then so does X ∪ {y} for
each y, then all sets satisfy ϕ. This induction principle corresponds to the inductive
1Wang removes from ZF Infinity without replacing it with its negation, since he does not interpret
finite set theory in PA.
2The subtext is, of course, the conviction that ZFC is the canonical formal framework for all of
mathematics.
2
definition of finite sets as the objects generated by successively joining elements to ∅.
Mayberry [13] defines an arithmetic based on induction on sets, which he deftly
dubs Euclidean Arithmetic. He considers a number of induction principles derived from
the set-induction principle above, but allows for neither set quantifiers nor unbounded
atomic quantifiers in the induction formula. Consequently, his system is mutually
interpretable with a weak number theory, namely I∆0 extended with an exponentiation
function (detailed proof in [9]). Pettigrew [15, 16] shows that these two theories are
also equipollent with a bounded version of ZFf .
Our approach differs from the ones above in several respects. Our theory FS of
finite structures is based on finite structures rather than finite sets, and is formally
second-order, in contrast to theories based on ZF, which on the one hand are first-
order, and on the other hand refer to a cumulative hierarchy of sets. At the same time,
FS’s second-order nature is weak, in that its induction principle implies that its second-
order object are finite. As a result, our theory of finite structures, although based on
a variant of set induction (and not ZFf ) is equipollent to full Peano Arithmetic.
Principally, our motivation is to develop new natural tools for the analysis and
verification or computing and programming. We are particularly interested in novel
forms of calibrating computational resources by syntactic methods. In [12] we already
show that, by using finite structures as focal concept, one obtains an abstract char-
acterization of primitive recursive mathematics based on the concept of loop variant,
familiar from program verification.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we lay out our funda-
mental concepts and notations. Our theory FS of finite structures is presented in §3,
followed by its programming language counterpart ST in §4. We then prove in §5 an
abstract generalization of Kleene’s classical theorem about the existential definability
of computability, and use it in §6 to show that FS is mutually interpretable in Peano
Arithmetic.
2 Finite structures
2.1 Finite functions
Our basic notion is the finite partial structure, in which function-identifiers are inter-
preted as partial-functions. For example, we construe binary strings as structures over
the vocabulary with a constant e and unary function identifiers 0 and 1. E.g., 011 is
taken to be the four element structure
e ◦
0
−→ ◦
1
−→ ◦
1
−→ ◦
Here 0 is interpreted as the partial-function defined only for the leftmost atom, and 1 as
the partial-function defined only for the second and third. As in Gurevich’s ASM, we
posit our finite structures to live within a denumerable set A of atoms, i.e. unspecified
and unstructured objects. To accommodate non-denoting terms we extend A to a flat
domain A⊥, where in addition to the atoms we posit a fresh object ⊥, intended to
denote “undefined.” The elements of A are the standard elements of A⊥.
3
3We refer neither to boolean values not to “background structures” [1] on top of atoms.
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By an A-function we mean a finite k-ary partial-function over A, where k > 0;
thus, the nullary A-functions are the atoms. We identify an A-function F with the
total function F˜ : Ak
⊥
→ A⊥ satisfying
F˜ (a1, . . . , ak) = min(F (a1, . . . , ak), ⊥)
= if F (a1, . . . , ak) = b ∈ A then b else ⊥
(1)
Note that F˜ is necessarily strict, i.e. its output is ⊥ whenever one of its inputs is. For
each k we let ∅k be the empty k-ary A-function, i.e. the one that returns ⊥ for every
input. When in no danger of confusion we write ∅ for ∅k. The scope of F is the set of
atoms occurring in its entries.
Function partiality provides a natural representation of finite relations over A by
partial functions, without recourse to booleans. We represent a finite k-ary relation R
over A (k > 0) by k-ary A-functions whose domain is R, notably the function
ξR(a1, . . . , ak) = if R(a1, . . . , ak) then a1 else ⊥
2.2 A-structures over a vocabulary
A vocabulary is a finite set V of function-identifiers, with each f ∈ V assigned an
arity r(f) > 0. We refer to nullary function-identifiers as tokens and to unary ones as
pointers. For the moment we might think of these identifiers as reserved names, but
they can be construed just the same as (permanently free) variables.
An entry of an A-function F is a tuple 〈a1 . . . ak, b〉 where b = F (a1, . . . , ak) 6= ⊥.
σ is an A-structure over V if it is a mapping that to each f k ∈ V , assigns a k-ary
A-function σ(f), said to be a component of σ. The scope of σ is the union of the scopes
of its components.
If σ is an A-structure over V , and τ an A-structure over W ⊇ V , then τ is an
expansion of σ (to W ), and σ a reduct of τ (to V ), if the two structures have the same
interpretation for identifiers in V (the scope of τ may be strictly larger than that of
σ). For A-structures σ and τ over the same vocabulary, we say that σ is a substructure
of τ if every entry of σ is an entry of τ .
A finite collection of structures is itself a structure: if σi is a structure over Vi
(i ∈ I), then the collection is the union σ =
⋃
i∈Iσi over the disjoint union of the
vocabularies.
Given a vocabulary V , the set TmV of V -terms is generated by
• ω ∈ TmV .
• If f k ∈ V , and t1, . . . , tk ∈ TmV then ft1 · · · tk ∈ TmV
Note that we write function application in formal terms without parentheses and com-
mas, as in fxy or f~x. We optionally superscript function identifiers by their arity,
and implicitly posit that the arity of a function matches the number of arguments
displayed; thus writing fk~a assumes that ~a is a vector of length k, and f~a (with no
superscript) that the vector ~a is as long as f ’s arity. A term is standard if ω does not
occur in it.
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Given an A-structure σ over V , the value of a V -term t in σ, denoted σ(t), is
obtained by recurrence on t:
1. σ(ω) = ⊥
2. For f k ∈ V , σ(ft1 · · · tk) = σ(f)(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tk))
An atom a ∈ A is V -accessible in σ if a = σ(t) for some t ∈ TmV . An A-structure
σ over V is accessible if every atom in the scope of σ is V -accessible. For example, if
V is without tokens then no atom of a V -structure can be accessible. If every atom in
the scope of an accessible structure σ is the value of a unique V -term we say that σ is
free. Note that an accessible A-structure σ can fail to be free even if all its components
are injective:
e
1 1
0
0
However, we have the straightforward observation:
Lemma 1 An accessible A-structure σ over V is free iff there is a finite set T of V -
terms, closed under taking sub-terms, such that the function σ : T → A is injective.
If q is a standard V -term, and T consists of the sub-terms of q, then we write T (q)
for the resulting free A-structure. It is often convenient to fix a reserved token, say
•, to denote in each structure T (q) its root, i.e. the term q as a whole. For example,
for nullary z and u, unary s, and binary f, the structures T (ssz), T (fzu), T (fszsz),
T (fzsz) are, respectively,
sz
ssz
z
s
s
z
sz
z
s
uz
fzu
fszsz
f
f
sz
fzsz
s
f
2.3 A second-order language
We wish to present a formal theory of finite structures, that deals not only with one
structure at a time, but with structure transformation, in particular by suitable im-
perative programs. To that end, we generalize our discussion from a single vocabulary
V to a vocabulary “on demand.” We posit for each k > 0 a denumerable sets of k-ary
variables, intended to range over the k-ary A-functions. The variables of arity k=0
and k>0 are dubbed atomic and functional, respectively. When a particular vocabu-
lary V = fr11 . . . f
rk
k is of interest (with the exhibited ordering of its identifiers), we write
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~gV (with the vocabulary’s name as superscript) for a vector of variables g1 . . . gk, with
r(gi) = ri. We update our definitions of the set Tm of terms, and of their semantics
in a structure σ, by referring to function variables rather than identifiers of a fixed
vocabulary.
An equation is a phrase of the form t
.
= q, where t,q ∈ Tm. The set Fm of
formulas is generated inductively by
1. Every equation is a formula;
2. Fm is closed under the propositional operators (¬,∧,∨ and →).
3. If ϕ is a formula, then so are ∀f r ϕ and ∃f r ϕ (r > 0).
Given an A-structure σ for a set W of variables, a variable fk, and k-ary A-
function F , we write {f := F}σ for the structure σ′ which is identical to σ, except
that σ′(f) = F . Given a formula ϕ and a structure σ, where all variables free in ϕ are
in the domain of σ, the truth of ϕ in σ, denoted σ |= ϕ, is defined by recurrence on
formulas, as follows.
σ |= t
.
= q iff σ(t) = σ(q)
σ |= ¬ϕ iff σ 6|= ϕ
Similarly for other connectives
σ |= ∀fk ϕ iff {f ← F} σ |= ϕ for all finite F : Ak ⇀ A
σ |= ∃fk ϕ iff {f ← F} σ |= ϕ for some finite F : Ak ⇀ A
(2)
When σ |= ϕ we also say that σ verifies ϕ. Clearly, σ |= ϕ depends only on σ(f) for
variables occurring free in ϕ.
Recall from (1) that we identify a finite F : Ak ⇀ A with its strict extension
F˜ : Ak
⊥
→ A⊥, so the quantifiers range over all strict ⊥-valued functions, which
for the nullary case k = 0 means that atomic variables may take any value in A⊥.
This definition departs from Tarski’s semantics in that quantification ranges over all
A-functions, regardless of the scope of σ.
2.4 First-order formulas
We call quantification over atomic variables first-order, and quantification over func-
tional variables second-order. A formula is first-order if all its quantifiers are first-order.
We use notation conventions for some important first-order formulas:
• ~t ∈ fk for f~t 6
.
= ω. We overload this convention, and write ~t ∈ f1 to mean
t1, . . . , tk ∈ f , where ~t = t1 . . . tk.
Dually, t ∈ fk abbreviates
∨
i+j=k−1 ∃~v
i, ~wj ~v t~w ∈ f
• ScopeV [x] ≡
∨
fk∈V (x ∈ f ) ∨ (∃~v x
.
= f~v ) (3)
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states that the atom denoted by x is in the scope of σ. Thus
σ |= ∀x ScopeV [x]→ϕ[x]
means that ϕ is true “within” σ, which is not the same as ∀x ϕ[x]. For example,
∀x x 6
.
= ω is true for all A-structures, whereas ∀x ScopeV [x]→x 6
.
= ω is false for
all A-structures.
• Let V = {z0, s1}. The V -structures that model the following formula are pre-
cisely the structures T (siz) for the natural numbers, described in §2.2.4
ν ≡ ( ∀x, y sx
.
=sy ∧ x 6
.
=ω ∧ y 6
.
=ω → x
.
=y )
∧ (∀x sx
.
=z ∨ ∃y x
.
=sy )
(4)
The following observation is a variant of a basic result of Finite Model Theory. We
shall not use it in this paper.
Proposition 2 Let ϕ be a first-order formula. The following problem is decidable
in polynomial time (in the size of the input structure presentation). We assume that
A-structure are given as tables.
• Given an A-structure σ, is ϕ true for σ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ. Absent second-order quantifiers, the only
case of interest is when the main operator of ϕ is an atomic quantifier, say ∀u. The
input’s format provides direct scanning of all entries that are in the scope of σ, and
the denotations of the A-functions all yield ⊥ for all other entries. From this the
calculation of the truth in σ of ∀uϕ is immediate. ✷
3 A theory of finite structures
3.1 On axiomatizing finiteness
Since our A-structure are built of functions, we refer to a generative process that
extends functions rather than sets ore relations. The set Fk of k-ary A-functions is
generated by:
• The empty k-ary function ∅k is in F
k;
• If F ∈ Fk, v ∈ ~u ∈ A, and F (~u) = ⊥, then extending F with an entry F~u = v
yields an A-function in Fk.
4We disregard here the token •
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From this inductive definition we obtain an Induction Schema for A-functions.
Using the abbreviations
ϕ[∅] :≡ ∀g (∀~w g ~w = ω) → ϕ[g]
and ϕ[{~u 7→ v} f ] :≡ ∀g ( g~u
.
= v ∧ ∀~w 6
.
= ~u g ~w
.
= f ~w ) → ϕ[g]
(5)
Induction for a formula ϕ[fk] (with a distinguished function-variable f) reads
(∀fk, ~u, v ϕ[f ] ∧ (f~u
.
=ω) → ϕ[{~u 7→ v} f ] )
→ ϕ[∅] → ∀f ϕ[f ]
(6)
Since the components of A-structures are A-functions, without constraints that re-
late them, there is no need to articulate a separate induction principle for A-structures.
Indeed, every A-structure σ for a vocabulary V = {f1, . . . , fk} is obtained by first gen-
erating the entries of σ(f1), then those for σ(f2), and so on. Note that this would no
longer be the case for an inductive definition of the class A of accessible structures,
whose components must be generated in tandem:5
• If σ = (F1 . . . Fk) is in A, ~a is in the scope of σ, (σf)(~a) = ⊥, and b ∈ A,
then extending σ with an entry Fi~a = b yields a structure in A.
3.2 The theory FS
Our axiomatic theory FS for A-functions has free and bound variables for atoms and
free and bound variables for functions of arbitrary positive arity. We use u, v, . . . as
syntactic parameters for atomic variables, and f, g, h, . . . as syntactic parameters for
functional variables, optionally superscripted with their arity when convenient.
The axiom schemas are the universal closures of the following templates, for all
arities i, k, terms t, and formulas ϕ. For a function variable f and variables ~u we write
~u ∈ f for f~u 6
.
= ω.
[Strictness] fu1 · · ·uk
.
= ω →
∨
iui
.
=ω
[Infinity] ∃~u fk~u
.
= ω
Note that this states that A is infinite (unbounded), and has no bearing on the
finiteness of A-functions.
[Empty-function] ∃gk ∀~u. g~u
.
= ω.
[Extension] ∃g g~u
.
= v ∧ ∀~w 6
.
= ~u g ~w
.
= f ~w
[Explicit-definition] ∃g ∀~u ( ~u ∈ f ∧ g~u
.
= t ) ∨ ( ~u 6∈ f ∧ g~u
.
= ω )
This schema combines Zermelo’s Separation Schema with an Explicit Definition
principle: g is defined by the term t, for arguments in the domain of f .
5We shall discuss the class A in detail elsewhere.
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[f-Induction] Recalling (6) above:
( ∀f, ~u, v ϕ[f ] ∧ (f~u
.
=ω) → ϕ[{~u 7→ v} f ] )
→ ϕ[∅] → ∀f ϕ[f ]
For each of the schemas [Empty-function], [Function-extension], and [Explicit-definition],
the function g asserted to exist is trivially unique, and so adding identifiers for these
functions is conservative over FS. We write ∅k, {~u 7→ v} f and λ~u ∈ f. t, respectively,
for these functions (one for every arity k > 1).
The relevant axiom-schemas above can be rephrased using these three constructs
as primitives:
[Empty-function] ∅ku1 · · ·uk
.
= ω
[Extension] ({~u 7→ v} f) ~u
.
= v ∧ ∀~w 6
.
= ~u ({~u 7→ v} f) ~w
.
= f ~w
[Explicit-definition] ∀~u ( ~u ∈ f ∧ (λ~v ∈ f) ~u
.
= t )
∨ ( ~u 6∈ f ∧ (λ~v ∈ f) ~u
.
= ω )
Also note the contra-positive form of f-Induction:
(∀f, ~u, v ψ[{~u 7→ v}f ] → ψ[f ]) → (ψ[h]→ ψ[∅]) (7)
3.3 Some derived schemas
[Union] ∃g ∀~u ~u ∈ g ↔ ( ~u ∈ f1 ∨ ~u ∈ f2 ).
The proof is by f-Induction on f2 and Extension.
[Composition] ∃hk ∀~x h~x
.
= f i(g1~x) · · · (gi~x) (8)
This follows from Explicit-definition and Union.
[Branching] ∃hk ∀~x ( f~x 6
.
= ω ∧ h~x
.
= f~x ) ∨ ( f~x
.
= ω ∧ h~x
.
= g~x )
The universal closure with respect to f, g is proved by inductions on f and g,
using Extension.
[Contraction] ∃g g~u
.
= ω ∧ ∀~w 6
.
= ~u g ~w
.
= f ~w (9)
This is the dual of Extension. The proof of (refeq:contraction) is by induction
on f for the universal closure of (9) with respect to ~u.
[Function pairing]
∀fk, gk ∃hk+1 ∃a, b ∀~x f~x
.
= ha~x ∧ g~x
.
= hb~x (10)
Much of the expressive and proof theoretic power of arithmetic is due to the
representation of finite sequences and finite sets of numbers by numbers. The
Function-pairing schema provides a representation of two k-ary A-functions by
a single (k+1)-ary A-function. Namely, f, g are “tagged” withing h by the tags
a, b respectively. In other words, writing hu for λ~x hu~x, we have f = ha and
g = hb. (We might require, in addition, that hu~x = ⊥ for all atoms u 6= a, b, but
this is inessential if we include a, b explicitly in the representation.)
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[Atomic-choice] A more interesting form of tagging is provided by the following
principles of Choice.
( ∀x ∈ f ∃y ϕ[~x, y] ) → ∃g ∀~x∈f ϕ[~x, g~x] (11)
This is analogous to [14, Lemma 2(e)], and is straightforward by induction on
f . Suppose the schema holds for f , yielding the function g. To show the schema
true for f ′ = {~u 7→ v}f suppose it satisfies the premise
∀~x ∈ f ∃y ϕ[~x, y] (12)
Then f satisfies (12) as well, yielding a g for the conclusion. Also, by (12) there
is an atom y such that ϕ[~u, y], and so the conclusion is satisfied by {~u 7→ y}g in
place of g.
[Function-choice] (∀~x ∈ f ∃g ϕ[~x, g]) → ∃h ∀~x∈f ϕ[~x, h~x]
where ϕ[~x, h~x] abbreviates ∀j ( (∀~y j~y
.
= h~x~y) → ϕ[~x, j] ). Note that
Atomic-choice is a special case of Function-choice, with g nullary.
Note that the bounding condition in the choice schemas above is essential: even
the simplest case
(∀x0∃y0ϕ[x, y]) → ∃f1∀x ϕ[x, fx] (13)
is false already for ϕ ≡ x
.
= y, since the identity function over A is not finite.
4 Imperative programs over A-structures
We define a variant of Gurevich’s abstract state machines (ASMs) [2, 6, 8], for
the transformation of A-structures. Transducer-programs define mappings between
structures, which are akin to the mappings underlying Fraenkel’s Replacement Axiom,
and more generally the proper classes of Bernays-Go¨del set theory. Namely, these
mappings are not A-functions, and are referred to in the theory FS via the formulas
that define them.
4.1 Structure revisions
Our structure transformation programming language, ST, is designed to be a Turing-
complete computing system for the transformation of finite partial-structures, us-
ing the simplest possible building blocks while maintaining expressiveness. An ST-
program takes an A-structure as input, and successively applies basic structure re-
visions to it. The process may terminate with a final A-structure when no further
revision is called for. For example, addition over N might be computed by a program
that takes as input a structure representing two natural numbers n1 and n2, and graft-
ing the second on top of the first. Doubling a number might be performed by copying
the input before grafting the copy over the input, or alternatively generating a new
structure by repeatedly extending it with two atoms while depleting the input.
We start by defining the basic operations of ST, to handle entries. Each such
operation maps a structure σ into a structure σ′ which is identical to σ with the
exceptions noted.
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1. An extension is a phrase f t1 · · · tk := q where the ti’s are standard terms and q
is a term. The intent is that σ′ is identical to σ, except that if σ(f t1 · · · tk) = ⊥
then σ′(f t1 · · · tk) = σ(q).
2. An inception is a phrase of the form c⇓, where c is a token. A common alternative
notation is c := new. The intent is that σ′ is identical to σ, except that if
σ(c) = ⊥, then σ′(c) is an atom not in the scope of σ. A more general form of
inception, with a fresh atom assigned to a term t is obtained as the composition
c⇓ ; fα1 · · ·αk := c; c := ω
where c is a reserved token.
We allow extensions and inceptions to refer to an identifier f not in the vocabulary
of σ, in which case the vocabulary of σ′ extends that of σ, and we posit that
σ(f) = ∅.
3. A contraction, the dual of an extension, is a phrase of the form fα1 · · ·αk ↑ . The
intent is that σ′ is identical to σ, except that σ′(fα1 · · ·αk) = ⊥.
4. A deletion, the dual of an inception, is a phrase of the form c⇑, where c is a token.
The intent is that σ′ is obtained by removing σ(c). That is, σ′ is identical to σ,
except that for all A-functions fk present and all a1 . . . ak ∈ A, if σ(f)~a = σ(c),
then σ′(f)~a = ⊥.
Note that a deletion cannot be obtained via the composition of contractions,
because σ(c) might be reached by A-functions of σ from atoms that are not
accessible, in which case the atom σ(c) cannot be eliminated from the scope of
σ′ by contractions alone.
We refer to extensions, contractions, inceptions and deletions as revisions. Exten-
sions and inceptions are then constructive revisions, whereas contractions and deletions
are the destructive revisions.
An extension and a contraction can be combined into an assignment, i.e. a phrase
of the form f~t := q. This can be viewed as an abbreviation, with b a fresh token, for
the composition of four revisions:
b↓q; f~t ↑; f~t↓b; b↑
(Note that the atom denoted by q (when defined) is being memorized by b, since
q may become inaccessible due to the contraction f~t ↑.) Although assignments are
common and useful, we prefer contractions and extensions as basic constructs, for two
reasons. First, these constructs are truly elemental. More concretely, the distinction
between constructive and destructive revisions plays a role in implicit characterizations
of computational complexity classes, as for example in [12].
4.2 ST programs
Our programming language ST for structure transformation consists of guarded itera-
tive programs using revisions as basic operations. Define a guard to be a quantifier-free
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formula.6 The programs of ST are generated inductively as follows.
1. A structure-revision is a program.
2. If P and Q are programs and G is a guard, then P ; Q, if [G] {P} {Q} and
do [G] {P} are programs.
For a program P we define the binary yield relation ⇒P between structures by
recurrence on P . For P a revision the definition follows the intended semantics de-
scribed informally above. The cases for composition, branching, and iteration, are
straightforward as usual.
Let Φ : C ⇀ C′ be a partial-mapping from a class C of A-structures to a class C′ of
A-structures. A program P computes Φ if for every σ ∈ C, σ ⇒P τ for some expansion
τ of Φ(σ). Note that the vocabulary of the output structure need not be related to
the input vocabulary.
4.3 Turing completeness
Guarded iterative programs are well known to be sound and complete for Turing
computability, and proofs of the Turing completeness of abstract state machines have
been given before (see for example [7, §3.1]). To dispel any concern that those proofs
need more than finite structures and our simple revision operations, we outline a proof
here.
Theorem 3 Let M be a Turing transducer computing a partial-function fM : Σ
∗→
Σ∗. There is an ST-program PM that, for every w ∈ Σ
∗, transforms T (w) to
T (fM (w)).
Proof. Suppose M uses an extended alphabet Γ ⊃ Σ, set of states Q, start state s,
print state p, and transition function δ. Recall that for w = γ1 · · · γk ∈ Γ
∗ we write
T (w) for the structure e ◦
γ1
−→ ◦ · · · ◦
γk−→◦.
Define VM to be the vocabulary with e, c and each state in Q as tokens; and with r
and each symbol in Γ as pointers. The intent is that a configuration (q, σ1 · · ·σi · · ·σk)
(i.e. with σi cursored) be represented by the VM -structure
◦
σ1−→ ◦ · · · ◦
σi−→ ◦ · · · ◦
σk−→ ◦
e, q c
All remaining tokens are undefined.
We define the program PM to implement the following phases:
1. Convert the input structure into the structure for the initial configuration, and
initialize c to the initial input element. Use a loop to initialize a fresh pointer
r to be the destructor function for the input string, to be used for backwards
movements of the cursor.
6Taking for guards arbitrary first-order formulas would not make a difference anywhere.
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2. Main loop: configurations are revised as called for by δ. The loop’s guard is p
(the “print” state) being undefined.
3. Convert the final configuration into the output.
✷
5 Computability implies existential definability
5.1 Expressing relation iteration
Suppose ϕ[~f V , ~g V ] is a formula, with variable-vectors ~f,~g, both for the vocabulary
V . Define the relation [ϕ]∗[~f V , ~g V ] as the least fixpoint of the closure conditions:
• [ϕ]∗[~f V , ~f V ] for all ~f V .
• If ϕ[~f V , ~g V ] and [ϕ]∗[~g V ,~h V ] then [ϕ]∗[~g V ,~h V ].
Theorem 4 For every formula ϕ[~f V , ~g V ] there is a formula ϕ∗[~f V , ~g V ] that defines
the relation [ϕ]∗[~f V , ~g V ].
Proof. By definition, [ϕ]∗[~f V , ~g V ] just in case there are ~hV0 , . . . ,
~hVk (k > 0) such
that
~h0 = ~f, ϕ[~h
V
i ,
~hVi+1] (i < k), and
~hk = ~g
The function-vectors ~hi can be bundled jointly into a single vector ~h, using a
vocabulary Vˆ with a fresh variable f¯k+1 for each f in V . We also refer to two fresh
auxiliary variables z0 and s1, and let the bundled vector ~h be defined by
~h Vˆ (s[i]z)~x) = hi(~x)
For a term t let ~ht = ~ℓ abbreviate ∀~u ~ℓ~u
.
= ~ht~u.
Now define
ϕ∗[~f V , ~g V ] ≡
∃z0, s1(z 6
.
= ω ∧ ∀x0, y0 (sx 6
.
= z) ∧ (sx=sy→x=y)
∧ ∃~h Vˆ ~hz = ~f
∧ ∀x ( sx 6
.
= ω → (∀~ℓ V ~m V ~ℓ = ~hx ∧ ~m = ~hsx → ϕ[~ℓ, ~m] )
∧ ( sx
.
= ω ∧ x 6
.
= ω → ~hx = ~g ))
(14)
✷
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Example. Let V be a vocabulary with identifiers of arity 6 k, and ~x, ~y etc. be vectors
of k atomic variables. Take for ϕ[g1, h1] the following formula (where g and h are
construed as sets).
∀x ( hx
.
= gx ∨
∨
fr∈V ∃y1 . . . yr ∈ g f~y ∈ h ∧ f~y 6∈ g
That is, h is identical to g except that it may contain additional atoms, all obtained
by applying some f ∈ V to elements of g. Then the existential formula
AV [u] ≡ ∃g
1 ϕ∗[∅, g] ∧ u ∈ g
defines the set of V -accessible atoms. Consequently,
∀u (
∨
f∈V u ∈ f) → AV [u]
is true for a V -structure σ iff σ is V -accessible.
5.2 Existential definability of computable relations between A-
structures
Theorem 5 For every ST-program P over V -structures, there is an existential for-
mula ϕP [
~f V , ~g V ] that holds iff ~f ⇒P ~g.
Proof. By induction on P .
• If P is a revision then ϕP is in fact first-order, and trivially defined.
• If P is Q;R, then by IH there are existential formulas ϕQ[~f,~h] and ϕR[~h, ~f ] that
hold just in case ~f ⇒Q ~h and ~h⇒Q ~g. We thus define
ϕP [
~f,~g] ≡ ∃~h ϕQ[~f,~h] ∧ ϕR[~h, ~f ]
which is existential if ϕA and ϕR are.
• If P is if[G]{Q}{R} we define
ϕP [
~f,~g] ≡ ( G[~f ] ∧ ϕQ[~f,~g] ) ∨ ( ¬G[~f ] ∧ ϕR[~f,~g] )
which is existential if ϕQ and ϕR are. Note that G here is first-order, so the
negation is harmless.
• If P is do[G]{Q}, let
ψ[~h,~j] ≡ G[~h] ∧ ϕQ[~h,~j]
and define
ϕP [
~f,~g] ≡ ψ⋆[~f,~g] ∧ ¬G[~g]
Here ψ⋆ is the existential formula defined in (14).
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✷Theorem 5 defines a binary relation between the initial and final configurations of
an ST-program. Given a convention on which program variables are to be considered
inputs and which output, the formula ϕP can be modified to express the input-output
relation computed by the program. For instance, if P uses variables f1 . . . fk, of which
f1 and f2 are used for the inputs, and f2 and f3 are used for the outputs, then the
I/O relation defined by P is
IOP [g1, g2; g
′
2, g
′
3] ≡ ∃g
′
1, g
′
4 . . . g
′
k ϕP [g1, g2,
~∅; g′1, . . . , g
′
k] (15)
6 Equipollence of FS and PA
6.1 Interpretation of arithmetic formulas in finite structures
The intended model of FS has no “universe” in the traditional, Tarskian, sense. Using
the structures T (s[n]z) as the target “elements” falls short of the natural embedding,
where natural numbers are interpreted as equivalence classes of such structures. Note
that we cannot take one representative from each equivalence class because there is
no way to formally identify such representatives. Consequently, we depart from the
traditional definition of interpretations between languages and between formal theories,
(see e.g. [3, §2.7]), relax the requirement that the source universe be interpreted by a
definable subset of the target universe, and interpret the natural numbers instead by
equivalence classes of structures satisfying ν (as defined in (4)).
The representation of natural numbers by equivalence classes of structures can now
be formalized as follows. Take PA to be based on logic without equality, that is with
equality considered a binary relation identifier rather than a logical constant, which
for PA happens to be interpreted as identity. The point is that our interpretation of
PA in FS must now include a definition of the interpretation of equality, though not
as the identity relation between the atoms of FS, but rather as structure isomorphism.
The property of a unary function f being an isomorphism between structures over the
vocabulary z0, s1 can be defined by
Isom[f ; z, s; z′, s′] ≡ fz = z′
∧ ∀a sa 6= ω → ( fsa = s′fa 6= ω )
(16)
Given that ν (as defined in (16)) is assumed true for (z, s) and (z′, s′), and that f
must be strict, the condition Isom[f ; z, s; z′, s′] above implies that the function f must
be a bijection. We now define the interpretation of the equality relation of PA as the
relation
Iso[z, s; z′, s′] ≡ ∃f1 Isom[z, s; z′s′]
between structures representing natural numbers.
We interpret the remaining non-logical constants of PA, namely 0, successor, ad-
dition and multiplication, via basic equations for them. For each variable xi of PA let
z0i and s
1
i be FS-variables. In any given context only finitely many N-variables will
15
be present, so the collection of all corresponding FS-variables will be finite as well.
Every equation of PA is equivalent to a formula involving only equation of one of the
following five forms:
xi = 0, xi = xj , xi = sxj , xi = xj + xk, and xi = xj · xk (17)
We define the following interpretation for such equations.
• (xi = 0)△ ≡ (zi 6= ω ∧ si = ∅).
• (xi = xj)△ ≡ ∃f1 Iso[f ; zi, si; zj , sj ] where Iso is as in (16).
• (xi = sxj)
△ ≡ ∃t1 Suc[sj ; t] ∧ Iso[zj , t; zi, si]
where Suc[s, t] is
∀a a 6= ω →
(sa 6= ω ∧ ta = sa)
∨ (sa = ω ∧ ta 6= ω ∧ tta = ω )
(18)
• (xi = xj + xk)△ ≡ ∃ z0, t1 ϕA[zj, sj , zk, sk; z, t] ∧ Iso[z, t; zi, si]
where ϕA is the existential formula defined by (15) for the ST-program A com-
puting addition,
• (xi = xj × xk)△ is defined similarly, referring to the ST-program for multiplica-
tion.
• Combining the previous cases, we easily define (by discourse-level induction on
terms) an interpretation (t = q)△ for all terms t,q.
We let the mapping △ commute with the connectives: (ϕ ∧ ψ)△ is ϕ△ ∧ ψ△, etc.
For the quantifiers we let
(∀xi ψ)△ ≡ ∀zi, si ν[zi, si] → ψ
△
(∃xi ψ)△ ≡ ∃zi, si ν[zi, si] ∧ ψ
△
(19)
Let N× be the standard model of PA, with zero, successor, addition, and multi-
plication as functions.
Theorem 6 The interpretation △ is semantically sound and complete: for every
closed formula ϕ of PA, ϕ is true in N× iff ϕ△ is true for all A-structures.
Proof. Consider the following fixed interpretation of the natural numbers as A-
structures. Let z0 be an atom (to interpret 0), and s an injective unary partial-function
z0
s
−→a1
s
−→a2 · ··. That is, z0 and s form a copy of N in A. Define the canonical
interpretation of n ∈ N to be the A-structure (z0, sn) where sn is s truncated to its
first n steps. Thus every A-structure satisfying ν is isomorphic to (z0, sn) for some n.
We prove that for each formula ϕ[x1, . . . , xk] of PA, the following conditions are
equivalent.
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1. N×, [x1←n1, . . . , xk←nk] |= ϕ
2. σ |= ϕ△[z1, s1 . . . zk, sk] where σ assigns to (zi, si) the canonical interpretation of
ni (i = 1..k).
3. σ |= ϕ△[z1, s1 . . . zk, sk] for every σ that assigns to each (zi, si) an interpretation
satisfying ν and of size ni.
We use induction on ϕ. For the induction basis, (1) and (2) are equivalent by the
definition of △, (2) implies (3) since the structures satisfying ν and of size n are all
isomorphic to the canonical structure for n, and (3) implies (2) trivially. The cases
for propositional connectives are all immediate. Finally, for quantifiers we have that
N×, [x1←n1, . . . , xk←nk] |= ∀xk+1ϕ iff N×, [x1←n1, . . . , xk←nk, xk+1←n] |= ϕ
for all n ∈ N, which by IH is equivalent to ϕ△[z1, s1 . . . zk, sk, zk+1, sk+1] being true
where (zi, si) is the canonical interpretation of ni (i 6 k) and (zk+1, sk+1) is any
structure of size n that satisfies ν, i.e. ∀zk+1, sk+1 ν[zk+1, sk+1]→ ϕ△ being true, i.e.
(∀xk+1 ϕ)△. This proves the equivalence of (1) and (3). The equivalence of (1) and
(2) is similar. ✷
6.2 Interpreting PA in FS
We proceed to show that the interpretation △ above from the language of PA to
that of FS is not only semantically sound and complete, but is also a proof-theoretic
interpretation of Peano Arithmetic in the theory FS.
Theorem 7 For every closed formula of PA, if PA ⊢ ϕ, then FS ⊢ ϕ△.
Proof. We verify that for every axiom ψ of PA, the formula
ψ✸ ≡
∧
{ν[zi, si] | xi free in ψ} → ψ
△
is provable in FS.
• For Peano’s Third Axiom, ψ ≡ sxi 6= 0, we have
ψ✸ ≡ ν[zi, si] → (∃t Suc[si; t] → ¬Iso[zi, t; zi,∅])
Reasoning within FS, Iso[zi, t; zi,∅]) implies t = ∅, which contradicts Suc[si; t].
• Peano’s Fourth Axiom,
ψ ≡ sxi = sxj → xi = xj
is rendered by
ψ✸ ≡ ν[zi, si] ∧ ν[zj , sj ]
→ Suc[si, s′i] ∧ Suc[sj , s
′
j ]
→ Iso[zi, s′i; zj , s
′
j] → Iso[zi, si; zj, sj ]
which is easily provable from the definitions.
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• The defining equations of addition and multiplication are treated similarly.
• Finally, consider an instance of PA’s Induction Schema,
ψ ≡ (∀xi ϕ[xi]→ϕ[sxi])→ ϕ[0]→ ϕ[xj ]
with free variables, say a single variable xm. We have
ψ✸ ≡ ν[zm, sm]
→ ( ∀ zi, si ν[zi, si] ∧ ϕ∆[zi, si]
∧ ∀ t, zk, sk Suc[si, t] ∧ Iso[zi, t; zk, sk] → ϕ∆[zk, sk] )
→ ϕ∆[zj ,∅]
→ ν[zj, sj ] → ϕ
△[zj, sj ]
(20)
We shall use the provability in FS of the following simple observations:
1. ν[z, s] ∧ Iso[z, s; z′, s′] → ν[z′, s′]
2. ν[z, s] ∧ Suc[s; t] → ν[z, t]
3. ν[z, {a 7→ b}s] → ν[z, s]
4. ϕ[z, s] ∧ Iso[z, s; z′, s′]→ ϕ[z′, s′]
5. a, b 6∈ f,~g → ξ[{~u 7→ a} f,~g] → ξ[{~u 7→ b} f,~g]
To prove ψ✸ within FS assume
6. ν[zm, sm]
7. ϕ∆[zj ,∅]
8. ∀zi, si ν[zi, si] ∧ ϕ∆[zi, si] ∧ ∀t, zk, sk Suc[si, t] ∧ Iso[zi, t; zk, sk] → ϕ∆[zk, sk])
9. ν[zj, sj ]
We use f-Induction for the formula
ζ[s] ≡ ν[zk, s]→ ϕ
△[zk, s]
By (7) and (1) we have ζ[∅]. Assume ζ[s], and consider ζ[s′] for s′ = {a 7→ b} s. If
ν[zk, s
′], then ν[zk, s], by (3), and so ϕ
△[zk, s], from ζ[s]. This implies, by (8),
∀t, zk, sk Suc[s, t] ∧ Iso[z, t; zk, sk] → ϕ
∆[zk, sk])
But we have Suc[s; s′], so taking s′ for both sk and t, and z for zk, we get ϕ
∆[z, s′].
We have thus completed both the basis and the step of the f-induction for ζ[s], and
conclude ψ✸.
In summary, we have shown that for every formula ϕ of PA we have
PA ⊢ ϕ implies FS ⊢ ϕ∆ (21)
✷
We shall show in Theorem 10 below that the inverse of (21) also hold, i.e. the
interpretation ϕ 7→ ϕ△ is faithful.
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6.3 Interpretation of FS in PA
Developing finite mathematics (and even much of mathematical analysis [19, Part 2]
in PA is nowadays a routine exercise. It would still be useful to articular a particular
interpretation. To simplify, we refer to the extension PA of PA with identifiers for
all primitive recursive functions and with their defining equations as axioms. PA is
well-known to be conservative over PA [21].
Our interpretation ψ 7→ ψ
△
of FS into PA represents the atoms by the natural
numbers: posit an enumeration a0, a1 . . . of the atoms, and represent an by n+1. ⊥ is
represented by 0. We code a finite set S = {m1, . . . ,mk} of natural numbers, displayed
in increasing order, by the natural number #S whose binary numeral is 1d0 . . . dmk ,
where di is 1 iff i ∈ S. Thus ∅ is coded by 1, {0} by 3 (binary 11), and {0, 2} by 13
(binary 1101). We represent an entry e = 〈an1 , . . . , ank , am〉 of a k-ary function (k > 0)
by the number #e whose binary numeral is 10m10n11 · · · 10nk . A k-ary A-function f
is the finite set of its entries, so we represent it as #f = #{#e | e an entry of f }.
Clearly we have for each k > 0 a primitive-recursive (p.r.) predicate Gk that
identifies the codes of strict k-ary A-functions. We use these predicates to refer to the
syntax of FS, and to interpret formulas ψ of FS as formulas ψ
△
of (extended) PA,
with quantifiers bounded to their intended range.
Proposition 8 For every formula ψ of FS, ψ is valid iff ψ
△
is true in the structure
NPR of the natural numbers with the primitive recursive functions.
Proof. By straightforward induction on ψ. ✷
The semantic correctness of the interpretation ψ 7→ ψ
△
extends to a proof theoretic
interpretation:
Proposition 9 For every formula ψ of FS, if FS ⊢ ψ then PA ⊢ ψ
△
.
Proof. Other than f-Induction, the interpretations of the axioms of FS are all triv-
ially provable in PA. As for an instance ψ of f-Induction (with fixed arity), ψ
△
is
provable in PA by induction on the size of the A-function f . ✷
From Proposition 9 we infer:
Theorem 10 The interpretation ϕ 7→ ϕ△ is faithful. That is, for every closed formula
ϕ of PA,
FS ⊢ ϕ∆ implies PA ⊢ ϕ (22)
Proof.
Proposition 9 implies that for a PA-formula ϕ,
FS ⊢ ϕ△ implies PA ⊢ (ϕ△)
△
(23)
It remains to observe that for every PA-formula ϕ,
PA ⊢ (ϕ△)
△
→ ϕ (24)
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This is proved by induction on ϕ, starting with the five forms of (17). The details are
straightforward. ✷
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